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Abstract 
Delusion proneness is an individual-differences characteristic, existing on a continuum from no 
delusional thoughts to a diagnosis of delusional disorder or schizophrenia. Previous research 
found delusion prone individuals are faster at making decisions and request less information to 
make them, potentially making a decision without sufficient information (jumping to 
conclusions). On the other hand, some research suggests that delusion prone individuals have a 
data gathering deficit rather than a problem with decision making. To date, most research in this 
area relied on use of a probabilistic reasoning task, and the ability to make advantageous 
decisions on other tasks has not been adequately examined. The present study examined risky 
decision making in individuals high and low in delusion proneness. Undergraduate student 
participants (n = 76) completed the Peters Delusions Inventory to assess delusion proneness, as 
well as the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and the Game of Dice Task (GDT) to assess risky 
decision making. It was hypothesized that the more delusion prone an individual is, the riskier 
they will be on the IGT but not the GDT. Correlational analyses found few significant 
relationships between delusion proneness and decision making. Specifically, individuals higher 
in delusion proneness decided more advantageously on one of the five blocks of trials of the 
IGT. The present study has implications for the assessment of decision-making in individuals 
with and without a history of delusions and will give further insight into the jumping to 
conclusions bias within the delusion prone population.  
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 Decision making deficits are seen across a variety of diagnosable mental health 
conditions, as well as in the general population. Understanding the factors that affect decision 
making is important, as it can provide insight into ways to improve decision making processes. 
One factor that could affect decision making is the presence of delusional beliefs. The present 
study will examine risky decision making as a function of delusion proneness, an individual 
differences variable existing on a continuum from no delusional beliefs to a diagnosis of 
delusional disorder or schizophrenia. First, the research on schizophrenia and delusions will be 
reviewed.  
Schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia is a diagnosable mental illness that disables around 1% of the population 
worldwide (Robertson, Hori, & Powell, 2005). Schizophrenia is a complex disorder with 
symptoms resulting from both environmental factors, including severe malnutrition during early 
stages of development, early exposure to viruses, recurrent psychological stress, and pre- and 
post-birth complications, and genetic factors such as being a relative of someone with the 
disorder (Robertson et al., 2005). According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013), schizophrenia is 
characterized by the presence of at least one of the following: positive symptoms, which add to 
an individual’s behavior (delusions and hallucinations), negative symptoms, that take away from 
their typical behavior (e.g., apathy and avolition), or disorganized symptoms, which are atypical 
emotional behaviors brought on by thought disturbances (disorganized thought, disorganized 
behavior, and catatonia).  
For the present study, the focus will be on one component of schizophrenia: delusional 
beliefs. In addition to being one of the main positive symptoms associated with schizophrenia, 
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delusions are also part of several additional DSM-5 disorders, including Delusional Disorder, 
Brief Psychotic Disorder, Schizophreniform Disorder, and Schizoaffective Disorder (APA, 
2013), as well as being present—to a lesser degree—in individuals without a diagnosable 
disorder. Delusions are described as imprecise thoughts and/or beliefs that continue to exist after 
being confronted with contradictory evidence (Peters, Joseph & Garety, 1999). Examples of 
common delusional beliefs are grandeur (belief one has a special ability, such as having a direct 
connection to an “almighty power”), erotomanic (the thought that a celebrity is incredibly in love 
with them), persecutory (believing someone is conspiring against them), and somatic (the belief 
that one’s body is not functioning properly; Porcher, 2016). It is widely understood that 
delusions are multidimensional in character and should be measured on three separate domains: 
conviction (how strongly one believes in the belief), preoccupation (how much time one spends 
thinking about the belief), and distress (how much the belief affects a person’s day-to-day life) 
(Peters et al., 1999). An individual can have varying levels of these domains for each delusional 
belief. For example, a delusion of grandeur might be high in conviction but low in preoccupation 
and distress, whereas the same individual’s delusion of persecution might be low in conviction 
but high in preoccupation and distress.  
Delusion Proneness 
Delusions are a common component of schizophrenia, though not all individuals who 
experience delusions have an underlying psychiatric diagnosis. However, delusions are a main 
focus when evaluating and diagnosing someone with a psychotic disorder. Delusions can have a 
large impact on the direction of treatment for both the personal (e.g. becoming unrecognizable to 
yourself) and social (e.g. becoming afraid to leave the indoors due to the fear delusions may have 
instilled in you) components of schizophrenia (Porcher, 2016). Delusions are believed to exist on 
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a spectrum where delusions strong enough to be associated with psychotic disorders are at one 
extreme, and the complete absence of delusional thoughts or beliefs are at the other (Ho-wai So 
& Kwok, 2015). Existing between the two ends of the spectrum is a factor called delusion 
proneness, an individual-differences characteristic that can be defined by a person scoring high 
or low (based on a median split) on a delusion proneness measure (Peters et al., 1999). 
Individuals who are considered delusion-prone typically have varying extents of frequency or 
occurrence of delusions. For example, one individual may experience one delusion whereas 
another individual may experience 10 delusions. The magnitude of conviction, preoccupation, 
and distress of the delusion ranges from low to high in each individual as well. This shows that 
delusions are not necessarily “all or nothing” false beliefs, but rather beliefs that can vary on 
conviction, preoccupation, and distress leading to different effects on the individual’s everyday 
life (Peters et al., 1999). 
Cognition in Schizophrenia and Delusion Proneness  
Cognitive impairments are a core feature of schizophrenia. Cognitive performance among 
individuals with schizophrenia is, on average, one standard deviation below that of healthy 
control participants (Lennertz et al., 2015). Impairments are found across many cognitive 
domains, such as attention and memory, but are most often noticed in the domain of executive 
functions. Executive functions are cognitive processes that allow us to function in daily life, 
including the capacity to plan ahead, create goals, predict outcomes of decisions made, direct 
attention, organize thoughts/behaviors, and manipulate information for further use (Cicerone et 
al., 2000). Executive functions are linked with the frontal lobe of the brain, and with the 
prefrontal cortex in particular (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Anderson, 1998). Decision making 
is one of these executive functions, and is the focus of the present study.  
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 Frontal lobe disturbances have been considered one of the main factors in schizophrenia 
(Jackowski et al., 2012). Computerized tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) have been used to show the frontal lobe’s involvement in schizophrenia, finding that 
individuals with a significantly decreased frontal lobe volume show impairments on executive 
tasks such as the Wisconsin Card Sort (WCST), Stroop color word test, Trail Making Test 
(TMT), and verbal fluency (Sanz de la Torre, Barrios, & Junque, 2004). Studies using functional 
MRI found abnormal neuronal activation among individuals with schizophrenia was related to 
dysfunction in higher cognitive abilities and working memory in particular (Nygard et al., 2013).   
Most cognitive declines within the executive function domain among individuals with 
schizophrenia are noticed in areas such as information processing, attention, working memory, 
verbal and visual learning (with subsequent effects on memory), reasoning and problem solving, 
verbal comprehension, and decision-making (Ferreri, Agbokou, & Gauthier, 2006). Tasks such 
as the WCST, Digital Symbol Substitution Task (DSST), Forward and Backward Digit Span 
(FDS & BDS), and the TMT have been used to assess executive functions in schizophrenia 
patients (Ochoa et al., 2014) as well as those with delusions and other delusional disorders. 
Results from these tasks show that participants with schizophrenia perform worse than control 
participants (Ochoa et al., 2014), indicating impaired executive functions associated with the 
disorder. Some of the same tasks (TMT, Stroop color word test, WCST) have been used to 
determine the impact of delusions on executive function and memory, showing that participants 
with delusions in schizophrenia performed worse than controls (Ibanez-Casas et al., 2013). In 
sum, executive impairments are seen both in schizophrenia and individuals experiencing 
delusions (but without a psychiatric diagnosis).  
Decision Making 
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The process in which a choice is made when presented with multiple alternatives can be 
referred to as decision making (Reber, Allen, & Reber, 2009). Decision making deficits in 
individuals with schizophrenia have also been studied. In one study, goal-directed behavior, 
selecting a specific goal and making choices in order to reach that goal, was assessed by using a 
delay discounting task, a task in which participants are presented with choices that reward them 
either immediately (but are smaller) or at some point in the future (but are larger; Weller et al., 
2014). The results from this study showed that individuals with schizophrenia were less willing 
to wait for a larger reward if it takes time to get it, instead opting for the smaller but immediate 
reward. Decision making under risk refers to the process of making decisions when there are 
known potential negative consequences associated with the decision. Decision making under 
risk, or risky decision making, is frequently assessed in schizophrenia patients by administering 
the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994), Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; 
Lejuez et al., 2002), and the Game of Dice Task (GDT; Brand et al., 2005). Individuals with 
schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder, a combination of schizophrenia and a mood disorder, 
presented scores indicating a continuous disadvantageous strategy on the IGT, where new 
information was not incorporated into the decision making process (e.g., Bark, Dieckmann, 
Bogerts, & Northoff, 2005; Brown et al., 2015; Cheng, Tang, Li, Lau, & Lee, 2012; Fond et al., 
2013; Premkumar et al., 2008).  
Past research indicated that people diagnosed with schizophrenia show a tendency 
towards what is referred to as a “jumping to conclusions” (JTC) bias (Linney, Peters, & Ayton, 
1998). The JTC bias suggests that the schizophrenic individual requests less information and 
becomes more abrupt in making decisions. A participant with the JTC bias will utilize less 
information in a decision than a healthy control participant (Garety & Freeman, 1999). For 
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example, someone with schizophrenia who was asked to make a decision in a lab study would 
more quickly come to a decision, and with less requested information, than a control participant. 
One could even refer to this decision making process as impulsive. Across studies, the JTC bias 
has been seen in individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia (Moritz, Woodward, & Lambert, 
2007), with the researchers theorizing this bias occurs due to executive dysfunction and 
impairments in the PFC (Sanz de la Torre et al, 2004). It is possible that this JTC bias could 
occur on other measures of decision making, such as the behavioral decision making tasks 
previously described.  
The JTC bias has been found in delusion prone individuals as well. Researchers found 
individuals who are delusion prone (i.e., high delusion proneness), reach decisions much faster 
than those who are not (Warman, 2008). However, there is a speed-accuracy trade-off in decision 
making, such that making quicker decisions does not always result in more accurate (or less 
risky) decisions (Fitts, 1954; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992; Ratcliff, Thompson, & 
McKoon, 2015). In particular, delusion proneness had a negative effect on performance on the 
Stroop task, in that participants responded more quickly but less accurately (i.e., jumping to 
conclusions) on the task (Orem & Bedswell, 2010). This relationship makes sense, given the 
strong negative relationship between delusional thoughts and cognitive impairments (Stainsby & 
Loveall, 2014). However, there is very little research on delusion prone individuals and their 
cognitive functions to date, as most of the past research consists of examining their ability to 
perform decision-making tasks such as the beads task. In the beads task, participants are 
presented with two jars and are shown beads that have been drawn from one of the two jars. 
They need to guess which jar the beads came from with this limited information. Participants are 
then asked to make this decision based off of what they know about the color of the beads (red, 
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blue) and the two jars (80% blue, 20% blue) (Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988). Numerous studies 
have shown that individuals who are delusion-prone show the JTC bias while participating in this 
task (Linney, Peters, & Ayton, 1998; Ho-wai So & Kwok, 2015; van der Leer & McKay, 2014) 
by requesting less beads to make a decision, even when monetary rewards were introduced.  
The JTC bias shares common features with another factor known to influence decision 
making: heuristics. Heuristics are rules or guidelines that can help individuals arrive at an 
efficient decision (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988), but can 
also introduce bias (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Using heuristics is necessary, as they can 
shorten decision speed, but may lead to a less optimal decision than one made through a slower, 
more evaluative process. Hence, the JTC bias and heuristics both refer to making somewhat 
more impulsive decisions than would be optimal. Slowing down decision making speed can 
improve performance on some decision making tasks (e.g., Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs, & 
van den Brink, 2005), whereas speeding up decision making can result in riskier performance 
(e.g., Buelow, Hupp, Porter, & Coleman, 2018; Cella, Dymond, Cooper, & Turnbull, 2007). 
Although the JTC bias has been studied in delusion proneness, it has not been studied with the 
same behavioral tasks as assessed in studies of schizophrenia. Thus, previous research into 
heuristics could be used to inform our understanding of how delusion proneness might affect 
decision making. But, the specific task used to assess decision making can lead to different 
decision making processes.  
Two commonly utilized behavioral decision making tasks are the IGT and the GDT. The 
IGT assesses risky decision making by having participants learn through trial-and-error feedback 
which two decks of cards are advantageous and which two decks of cards are disadvantageous 
(Bechara et al., 1994). The GDT was created to remove the learning-based decision making 
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component of the IGT, and instead assesses risky decision making when all necessary 
information needed to make a decision is presented at the start of the task (Brand et al., 2005). 
Although no study to date has examined performance on both of these tasks in delusion 
proneness or schizophrenia, it is likely that the JTC bias would affect performance differently on 
these tasks. As individuals do not need to learn to decide advantageously on the GDT, instead 
just needing to utilize the already presented information to make a decision, it is likely that the 
JTC bias would not affect decision making on this task. But, to maximize decision making on the 
IGT, individuals need to utilize feedback from each decision to learn which decks are “good” 
and which are “bad.” Failing to pay attention to the feedback, or jumping to conclusions, on the 
IGT will in turn result in risky performance. Thus, utilizing these two tasks allows for an 
examination of how JTC bias affects the decision making process in delusion prone individuals.  
The Present Study  
The present study sought to examine the relationship between risky decision making and 
those who are high and low in delusion proneness. Considering a large amount of research on 
decision making in delusion proneness has been conducted with the beads task, this study will 
instead focus on decision making on the IGT and GDT given the extensive research on these 
tasks in schizophrenia. Past research found that the JTC bias results from a data gathering deficit, 
where individuals high in delusion proneness will acquire less information throughout the task 
leading to a worse outcome. Several hypotheses will be tested. First, individuals reporting higher 
levels of delusion proneness will be riskier on the IGT (i.e., select more from the 
disadvantageous decks as the task progresses) than individuals reporting lower levels of delusion 
proneness, due to a data gathering deficit on this learning-based decision making task. This 
difference was not hypothesized for the GDT, as no learning occurs over the course of this task. 
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It was also hypothesized that levels of conviction would be correlated with performance on the 
IGT but not the GDT, given the previous research showing a relationship between conviction 
and the JTC bias. No hypothesis was made for preoccupation or distress, as these have received 
less attention in the literature. We consider these final analyses exploratory.  
Methods 
Participants 
 Prior to the start of the in-person study, an online screening was administered to assess 
for levels of delusion proneness. A total of 424 undergraduate student participants at OSU 
Newark, ages 18-60 (Mage = 18.85, SDage = 3.23, 154 males), completed the online screening and 
received course credit for their participation. Of those, 76 (23 males, ages 18-23 [Mage = 18.44, 
SDage = 0.84], 67.6% Caucasian) chose to also complete the in-person study assessing decision 
making.  
Procedure 
 The university’s Institutional Review Board approved the present study. Prior to 
participating in the online and in-lab sessions of the study, participants gave informed consent. 
During the online session, participants completed the PDI and provided basic demographic 
information. Any participant that completed the online study could then decide to sign-up for the 
in-person follow-up study. During the in-person study, participants completed the IGT and GDT 
in a counterbalanced order. At the end of each session, participants were debriefed and course 
credit was assigned.  
Measures 
 Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI).   The PDI was created to measure delusion proneness 
in a non-psychiatric population (Peters et al., 1999). This questionnaire contains items developed 
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to examine the intensity of delusions and their components (conviction, preoccupation, and 
distress; Peters et al., 1999). The 40-items assess level of delusion proneness with responses to 
four questions per item. Participants first responded “yes” or “no” to the particular delusion 
presented. If the participant responded “yes,” then they rated their conviction, preoccupation, and 
distress with that delusion on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very). An example item from the 
questionnaire is, “Do you ever feel as if the world is about to end?” To assess level of delusion 
proneness, a total score was calculated that ranged from 0 (no delusion proneness) to 40 
(significant delusion proneness). For conviction, preoccupation, and distress, an average score 
was calculated for each subscale such that higher scores indicated higher levels of the factors. 
The mean score for the participants who completed the in-person portion of the study was 10.11 
(Median = 10). For the participants who only completed the online-screening portion of the 
study, the mean score was 9.44 (Median = 8).  
 Game of Dice Task (GDT). The GDT, a computerized task that assesses risky decision 
making, is a simulation of a real-life gambling situation (Brand et al., 2005). Participants are 
given directions to maximize their profit by rolling a virtual die 18 times. Before each roll of the 
die, participants choose a single number or combination of up to four numbers, with each 
selection having a preset gain/loss amount associated with it. Making a selection of a single 
number provides the potential for the greatest profit but also the greatest loss ($1000). Selecting 
a combination of 4 numbers will provide a lesser gain or loss ($100). The present study used 
selections of 1, 2, 3, and 4 numbers to calculate a net score to assess risky decision making. The 
net score was calculated by subtracting the number of risky choices made (selections of 1 or 2 
numbers) from the number of less risky choices (selections of 3 or 4 numbers). Higher numbers 
indicated more advantageous (i.e., less risky) decision making.  
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 Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). The standard computerized version of the IGT was 
administered to all participants to assess level of risky decision making (Bechara, 2007). At the 
beginning of the game, participants are given a loan of $2,000. Instructions were given to 
maximize their amount of profit by the end of the game. Four decks (Decks A, B, C, and D) are 
presented to the participants. Decks A and B produce an average profit of $100 for each 
selection, and Decks C and D produce an average profit of $50 for each selection. Decks A and 
C yield losses on fifty percent of their trials and ten percent of trials for Decks B and D. After 
making 10 selections from Decks A and B, participants have accrued a net loss of $250, when 
participants who have made 10 selections from Decks C and D have accrued a net gain of $250 
(Bechara et al. 1994). Decks A and B are considered to be disadvantageous decks, deeming 
selections from them as risky, leaving Decks C and D to be considered advantageous decks 
(Bechara et al. 1994). Decks are considered to be advantageous or disadvantageous based on the 
amount gained verses the amount lost from the selection of each deck. In addition, the type of 
decision making assessed on the IGT changes as the task progresses. Early selections are made 
under ambiguity, as participants have not learned much about the relative risks and benefits of 
the decks. After approximately 40 trials, however, the IGT instead begins to assess decision 
making under risk. Participants are now making decisions based on prior feedback, and have at 
least a general sense of the relative risks and benefits of selections from each deck. For the 
present study, scores were calculated by subtracting the total of disadvantageous choices from 
the advantageous ones by 20-card blocks of trials (Block 1: Trials 1-20; Block 2: Trials 21-40; 
Block 3: Trials 41-60; Block 4: Trials 61-80; Block 5: Trials 81-100). More positive values 
indicated more advantageous decision making.  
Data Analysis 
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 To assess the first hypothesis that individuals reporting higher levels of delusion 
proneness would be riskier on the IGT but not the GDT, two analyses were conducted. First, 
Pearson’s correlations were conducted between level of delusion proneness and performance on 
the IGT and GDT. In addition, a mixed ANOVA with IGT Block as a repeated-measures 
variable and median split (high, low) as the between-subjects variable was calculated, per the 
scoring criteria from Peters et al. (1999). An independent-samples t-test examined the PDI 
median split on the GDT. To assess the second hypothesis that level of conviction would be 
correlated with performance on the IGT but not the GDT, correlations were also calculated 
between levels of conviction, preoccupation, and distress and performance on the IGT and GDT.  
Results 
 Table 1 contains the variable means and standard deviations, and Table 2 contains the 
correlations between study variables. Two participants were removed from the analyses, as 
examination of their patterns of performance on the IGT indicated previous experience with the 
task (i.e., first 20 selections from the same deck). Of note, computer malfunction led to the loss 
of some data on the IGT, lowering the degrees of freedom on the remaining analyses.  
Correlational analyses showed no significant relationship between delusion proneness 
total score and performance on Block 1 (p = .724), Block 2 (p = .107), Block 3 (p = .139), and 
Block 5 (p = .726) of the IGT. On Block 4, individuals high in delusion proneness decided more 
advantageously than individuals low in delusion proneness, p = .038. There was not a significant 
relationship between delusion proneness and the GDT, p = .231. With regard to conviction, 
distress, and preoccupation, none of these factors was associated with performance on the GDT 
(ps > .442) or IGT (ps > 1.58).  
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 Next, a median split was calculated on the delusion proneness total score, as 
recommended by the PDI creators. The median score was 10 out of a possible 40, and the 
variable was recoded as 1 (below median) and 2 (above median). The mixed ANOVA indicated a 
main effect of Block, F(4,56) = 4.64, p = .003, partial η2 = .249, and the main effect of median 
split group was significant, F(1,59) = 4.69, p = .034, partial η2 =.074. However, the main effects 
will not be interpreted as the interaction was significant, F(4,56) = 2.91, p = .029, partial η2 = 
.172. In Block 1 (p = .667) and Block 2 (p = .166), no differences emerged between groups. On 
Blocks 3 (p = .021) and 4 (p = .004), participants who scored above the median split (i.e., higher 
in delusion proneness) selected more advantageously than participants scoring below the median 
split on the PDI. In Block 5, no differences emerged (p = .615). No significant differences 
emerged between groups on the GDT, t(68) = -0.12, p = .908.  
Discussion 
 The present study examined the relationship between risky decision making and delusion 
proneness, as most research on risky decision making to date focused instead on individuals with 
a diagnosis of schizophrenia. In addition, the subcomponents of delusion proneness (conviction, 
distress, preoccupation) were also examined. The present study also utilized the IGT and GDT, 
tasks not typically assessed in previous studies of delusion proneness. Limited support was found 
for the first hypothesis, that participants scoring higher in delusion proneness would be riskier on 
the IGT (but not the GDT) than individuals scoring lower in delusion proneness. The results 
indicated no relationship between total delusions on the PDI and performance on the GDT. On 
the GDT, participants are told explicitly at the start of the task how much money they could win 
or lose based on a particular decision. No information needed to be “discovered” during the task, 
and thus it was likely the jumping to conclusions bias would not be in play during this task. 
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However, on the IGT only one significant correlation emerged. Contrary to our hypothesis, on 
Block 4, during the decision making under risk trials, individuals high in delusion proneness 
actually decided more advantageously than individuals low in delusion proneness. Although the 
IGT has not been previously examined with a sample high in delusion proneness, this finding is 
contrary to previous research in schizophrenia (Bark et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2015; Cheng et 
al., 2012; Premkumar et al., 2008). In addition, it is unclear why this significant finding only 
occurred on Block 4, as Blocks 3 and 5 also are considered decision making under risk trials. 
That said, the exploratory median split analyses indicated a group difference on Blocks 3 and 4, 
and this finding is important for future research to examine.  
Additional hypotheses and study aims were tested. The second hypothesis tested was that 
level of conviction would be correlated with IGT scores. No support was found for this 
hypothesis, as no correlations emerged between performance on the IGT (or GDT) and level of 
conviction related to delusions. Finally, potential relationships between distress, preoccupation, 
and decision making were examined, with no significant results found on either the IGT or GDT.  
 These results were surprising given the body of previous research that showed 
contradictory evidence. Most research on delusion proneness, though limited mainly to 
performance on a probabilistic classification task, found a jumping to conclusions bias among 
delusion prone individuals (Garety, Hemsley & Wessely, 1991; Huq et al., 1988), suggesting 
impaired decision making at least to some degree. But, some studies found the opposite: delusion 
prone individuals actually performed better than the non-delusion prone participants (Freeman, 
Pugh, Vorontsova, Antley & Slater, 2010; Warman, Lysaker, Martin, Davis & Haudenschield, 
2007). These authors purposed that it is possible that high delusion prone individuals adjust their 
data gathering abilities to the type of task at hand. For example, they would expend greater 
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resources on a harder than an easier task. This assumption may be applicable within the results of 
the present study, as the nature of the IGT and lack of instructions at the start of the task might 
make it a harder task. 
 The results from the present study indicate that the JTC bias is not present during risky 
decision making tasks such as the IGT and GDT. The majority of the previous research has used 
the beads task, a probabilistic task in which the difficulty level can be adjusted (Garety et al., 
1991). Garety et al. (1991) found that when the beads task is made more difficult, delusion prone 
individuals tend to require more information to make a decision, in turn making their 
performance comparable to non-delusion prone individuals. It has also been shown that the 
typical amount of trials performed during the beads task ranges from 5 to 10 (van der Leer et al., 
2017; van der Leer et al., 2014; Warman, 2008). The IGT spans over 100 trials, significantly 
more than the 5 to 10 trials performed during the beads task. This gives the implication that 
participants recognize the lack of simplicity within the IGT, initiating a response to try harder. 
Another factor that may have affected performance on the IGT was the amount of direction 
given in the beginning of the task. In the beads task, there are specific directions given on how 
the task works. The IGT on the other hand is very ambiguous with directions, participants are 
required to learn the rules of the task as they perform it. The ambiguity of the task may have 
enhanced the perceived level of difficulty for the participants. Taken together, it is possible that 
nuances of the IGT itself led to its interpretation by participants as a harder task requiring greater 
effort and attention to detail, in turn “normalizing” performance on the task among delusion 
prone individuals.  
Limitations 
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  The present study had several limitations. First, the body of participants from which the 
data was drawn from could be a potential limitation. The participants were undergraduate 
students, who are commonly participants in studies of the IGT and GDT. Steingroever and 
Wetzels (2012) concluded that the body of research performed with the IGT and within 
undergraduate student participants has shown a wide range of scores, due in part to issues with 
lack of motivation from the participants. Considering the students participating in the study had 
nothing to gain from the completing the IGT, a lack of motivation may have been present in 
some individuals. That said, previous research has shown no differences in performance on the 
IGT when participants are informed in advance they will be paid for their participation 
(Bevelhymer-Rangel, 2013). Another limitation of the present study would be the sample size 
(n=74). This is a relatively small amount of participants and could account for the variability 
within the results. Future research should include a much larger sample. As the sample came 
from a group of undergraduate students, it is possible there was a restriction of range for the PDI 
scores. The PDI scores in the present study ranged from 0-28 (out of a possible score of 40), with 
a mean score of 10.19. It is possible that a sample of community members with a wider range of 
PDI scores (and higher mean score) would show a different relationship with decision making 
task performance. Finally, the present results may be due in part to a speed-accuracy trade-off. 
Participants may have slowed down the decision making process to arrive at the “correct” 
answer, in turn equalizing performance on the task by level of delusion proneness. 
Unfortunately, data on decision making speed was not collected for all participants, making 
analysis of this question difficult in the already small sample.    
Conclusion 
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 This study was the first to assess risky decision making as a function of delusion 
proneness with the IGT and the GDT. The results indicated few relationships between delusion 
proneness and performance on these risky decision making tasks. These results show the need 
for future studies to investigate decision making and delusion proneness further, as the small 
sample size could have affected results. One aspect that should be further studied is delusion 
prone individuals’ ability to adjust the amount of data they gather in respect to the level of 
perceived difficulty of the task. Future research utilizing both easy and hard tasks in the same 
study will help elucidate this data gathering deficit in delusion proneness.  
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Table 1.  
Means and standard deviations 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Range 
PDI    
     Total Score 10.19 6.79 0-28 
     Conviction 2.62 0.87 1-5 
     Distress 2.45 0.90 1-5 
     Preoccupation 2.55 0.87 1-5 
IGT 1-20 -3.10 5.39 -18-10 
IGT 21-40 -0.19 6.06 -18-20 
IGT 41-60 -0.44 7.07 -20-20 
IGT 61-80 1.23 7.13 -18-20 
IGT 81-100 1.61 7.91 -20-20 
GDT 4.06 10.43 -18-18 
 
Note: PDI = Peters Delusion Inventory; IGT = Iowa Gambling Task, advantageous minus 
disadvantageous selections by 20-card blocks of trials; GDT = Game of Dice Task, advantageous 
minus disadvantageous selections. 
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Table 2.  
Correlations between study variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. DP-t -- .353** .228 .373** .046 .208 
2. DP-c  -- .776*** .917*** .062 .087 
3. DP-d   -- .855*** .048 .189 
4. DP-p    -- .049 .129 
5. IGT 1     -- -.119 
6. IGT 2      -- 
7. IGT 3       
8. IGT 4       
9. IGT 5       
10. GDT       
 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
Note: PDI = Peters Delusion Inventory (c = conviction, d = distress; p = preoccupation); IGT = 
Iowa Gambling Task, advantageous minus disadvantageous selections by 20-card blocks of 
trials; GDT = Game of Dice Task, advantageous minus disadvantageous selections.  
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 7 8 9 10 
1. DP-t .192 .267* .046 -.120 
2. DP-c -.181 -.072 .050 -.062 
3. DP-d -.119 -.026 .056 -.097 
4. DP-p -.068 .020 .101 -.032 
5. IGT 1 -.015 .044 -.215 -.127 
6. IGT 2 .583*** .527*** .267* .243 
7. IGT 3 -- .734*** .307* .410** 
8. IGT 4  -- .534*** .278* 
9. IGT 5   -- -.018 
10. GDT    -- 
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Appendix A: Peters Delusion Inventory 
This questionnaire is designed to measure beliefs and vivid mental experiences. We believe that 
they are much more common than has previously been supposed, and that most people have had 
some such experiences during their lives. Please answer the following questions as honestly as 
you can. There are no right or wrong answers, and there are no trick questions. Please note that 
we are NOT interested in experiences people may have had when under the influence of drugs.  
 
For the questions you answer YES to, we are interested in: a) how distressing these beliefs or 
experiences are; b) how often you think about them; and c) how true you believe them to be.  
 
1. Do you ever feel as if you are under the control of some force or power other than yourself?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
2. Do you ever feel as if you are a robot or zombie without a will of your own?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
3. Do you ever feel as if you are possessed by someone or something else?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
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4. Do you ever feel as if your feelings or actions are not under your control?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
5. Do you ever feel as if someone or something is playing games with your mind?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
6. Do you ever feel as if people seem to drop hints about you or say things with a double 
meaning?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
7. Do you ever feel as if things in magazines or on TV were written especially for you?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
  
DECISION MAKING IN DELUSION PRONENESS      32 
8. Do you ever think that everyone is gossiping about you?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
9. Do you ever feel as if some people are not what they seem to be?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing  
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
10. Do things around you ever feel unreal, as though it was all part of an experiment?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
11. Do you ever feel as if someone is deliberately trying to harm you?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
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12. Do you ever feel as if you are being persecuted in some way?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
13. Do you ever feel as if there is a conspiracy against you?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
14. Do you ever feel as if some organization or institution has it in for you?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
15. Do you ever feel as if someone or something is watching you?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
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16. Do you ever feel as if you have special abilities or powers?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
17. Do you ever feel as if there is a special purpose or mission in your life?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
18. Do you ever feel as if there is a mysterious power working for the good of the world?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing  
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
19. Do you ever feel as if you are destined to be someone very important?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
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20. Do you ever feel that you are a very special or unusual person?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
21. Do you ever feel that you are especially close to God?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing  
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
22. Do you ever think that people can communicate telepathically?   
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
23. Do you ever feel as if electrical devices such as computers can influence the way you think?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
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24. Do you ever feel as if there are forces around you which affect you in strange ways?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
25. Do you ever feel as if you have been chosen by God in some way?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
26. Do you believe in the power of witchcraft, voodoo, or the occult?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
27. Are you often worried that your partner may be unfaithful?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
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28. Do you ever think that you smell very unusual to other people?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
29. Do you ever feel as if your body is changing in a peculiar way?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
30. Do you ever think that strangers want to have sex with you?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
31. Do you ever feel that you have sinned more than the average person?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
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32. Do you ever feel that people look at you oddly because of your appearance?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
33. Do you ever feel as if you had no thoughts in your head at all?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
34. Do you ever feel as if your insides might be rotting?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
35. Do you ever feel as if the world is about to end?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
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36. Do your thoughts ever feel alien to you in some way?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
37. Have your thoughts ever been so vivid that you were worried other people would hear them?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
 
38. Do you ever feel as if your own thoughts were being echoed back to you?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
 
39. Do you ever feel as if your thoughts were blocked by someone or something else?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
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40. Do you ever feel as if other people can read your mind?  
  No _____  Yes _____ 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Not at all distressing      Very distressing 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Hardly ever think about it         Think about it all the time 
  1  2  3  4  5 
 Don’t believe it’s true         Believe it is absolutely true 
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Appendix B: Iowa Gambling Task Instructions  
In front of you on the screen there are four decks of cards: A, B, C, and D. I want you to select 
one card at a time by clicking on the card from any deck you would like. Each time you select a 
card, the computer will tell you that you won some money. I don’t know how much money you 
will win. You will find out as you go along. Every time you win, the green bar will get bigger. 
Every so often, however, when you click on a card, the computer tells you that you have won 
some money, but also that you have lost some money. I don’t know when you will lose or how 
much you will lose. You will find out as you go along. Every time you lose, the green bar gets 
smaller.  
 
You are free to switch from one deck of cards to another at any time, as often as you wish. The 
goal of the game is to win as much money as possible, and if you can’t win money, the goal is to 
avoid losing as much money as possible. You won’t know when the game will end. Just keep 
playing until the computer stops. The computer is giving you $2000 credit to start the game. The 
red bar is a reminder of how much money you borrowed to play the game and how much money 
you have to pay back before we see how much money you won or lost.  
 
It is important to know that, just like in a real card game, the computer does not change the order 
of the cards after the game starts. You may not be able to figure out exactly when you will lose 
money, but the game is fair. The computer does not make you lose money at random, or make 
you lose money based on the last card you picked. Also, each deck contains an equal number of 
cards of each color, so the color of the cards does not tell you which decks are better in this 
game. So you must not try to figure out what the computer is doing. All I can say is that some 
decks are worse than others. No matter how much you find yourself losing, you can still win if 
you stay away from the worst decks. Please treat the play money in this game as real money, and 
make all decisions about what to do with it as if you were using your own money.  
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Appendix C: Game of Dice Task Instructions 
 
Welcome to the Game of Dice Task. 
In this task, you are going to throw a virtual dice 18 times. Before each throw, you will be able to 
bet on the outcome by selecting a single number (e.g., ‘3’) or combination of 2 to 4 numbers 
(e.g., ‘1-2-3’).  
The amount of money that can be won or lost differs between these combinations.  
You are given a starting capital of 1000 $. Your job is to maximize this capital within 18 throws 
of the dice.  
Good luck! 
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Appendix D: Demographic Questionnaire 
1. Age:  __________ 
2. Educational Level:    
 First year college _____  Fourth year college _____ 
 Second year college _____  Fifth year college _____ 
 Third year college _____  Other: _____________________ 
3. Major:  __________ 
4. Current GPA:  __________ 
5. What sex were you assigned at birth, on your original birth certificate:  
 Male _____   Female  _____ 
6. What is your current gender identity?  
 Male _____   Female  _____ 
 Trans male _____  Trans female _____ 
 Genderqueer/Gender non-conforming _____ 
 Different identity  _____ 
7. Please indicate your racial/ethnic background:  
 Caucasian  _____  Asian American/Pacific Islander _____ 
 African American _____  Asian _____  
 African  _____  American Indian/Alaskan Native _____ 
 Hispanic/Latino _____  Biracial/multiracial   _____ 
 Other   _____ 
8. What language do you speak as your native language?  __________ 
9. Marital Status:  
 Single  _____   Married _____ 
 Divorced _____   Widowed _____ 
 Other: ________________________ 
10. Political Affiliation:  
 Democrat _____   Republican _____ 
 Independent _____   Other: ______________________ 
11. Have you ever received a diagnosis of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) or 
Attention-Deficit Disorder (ADD)? 
 Yes __________ (Age diagnosed: ____ )  No __________ 
        If Yes, subtype:  Inattentive __________ 
      Hyperactive __________ 
      Combined __________ 
12. Who diagnosed you with ADHD or ADD? 
   Physician (MD)   __________ 
   Psychologist (PhD)   __________ 
   Psychiatrist (MD)   __________ 
   School Counselor or Psychologist __________ 
   Other (please specify):  ________________________ 
13. Have you ever received a diagnosis of a Learning Disorder (LD), such as a Reading 
Disorder, Writing Disorder, or Math Disorder? 
 Yes __________ (Age diagnosed: ____ )  No __________ 
